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Abstract—Smart cities need to connect physical devices as
a network to improve the efficiency of city operations and
services. Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is one of the
key components in smart cities, due to its capability of sup-
porting communications between vehicles to improve the driving
experience. Whilst Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications
are essential, cyber-security poses a significant challenge in V2X
communications. A V2X communication link is vulnerable to
various cyber-attacks including internal and external attacks.
Internal attacks cannot be detected by conventional security
schemes because the compromised nodes have valid credentials.
Thus, a new trust model is urgently needed to mitigate cyber-
security risks. In this paper, a global roaming trust-based security
model is proposed for V2X communications. Each vehicle has
a global knowledge about malicious nodes in the network.
In addition, various experiments are conducted with different
percentage of malicious nodes to measure the performance of the
proposed model. Simulation results show that the proposed model
improves False Negative Rate (FNR) by 33.5% in comparison
with the existing method.
Index Terms—Trust model, V2X, Cyber attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is one of the leading
smart systems which have been developed to obtain reliable
transportation. One vehicle can establish a communication
with other vehicles and/or infrastructure units using Vehicle-
to-Everything (V2X) communications. Vehicles include all
moving road entities, such as cars, bicycles, buses, trains
and motorcycles. The road entity periodically broadcasts a
message which contains status information, such as speed,
directions and location. V2X supports several types of com-
munication links as shown in Fig.1, e.g. Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V), Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G)
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I).
As a consequence, the communication link between road
entities is exposed to either internal or external cyber-attacks.
External attacks means that unauthorized nodes launch the
malicious behavior. Fortunately, the network can be pro-
tected against these attacks by applying conventional secu-
rity schemes, such as encryption and authentication. Internal
attacks means that authorized nodes initiate the malicious
behavior. Unfortunately, the compromised nodes are hard
to be detected because they have valid credentials. As a
result, a trust-based model was studied to protect the network
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Fig. 1. V2X communication links
against internal attacks in [1], by continuously monitoring
the surrounding nodes' behavior. When a misbehavior node
is detected, a warning alarm is sent to the network [2].
There is a rich literature on developing security models
to provide data confidentiality in V2X communications. For
instance, Liu et al. [3] designed a privacy-preserving ad
conversion protocol for V2X-assisted proximity marketing that
achieves input certification and output verifiability against
malicious ad networks. Ulybyshev et al. [4] suggested a data
exchange method for V2X communications, to ensure data
confidentiality and integrity. This method supports encrypted
search over encrypted vehicle records that could be stored
in untrusted cloud. Simplicio et al. [5] improved the struc-
ture of SCMS's certificate revocation and linkage approach
by addressing some limitations. The proposed modifications
support the temporary revocation and linkage of pseudonym
certificates. Furthermore, Cheng et al. [6] presented a re-
mote attestation security model based on a privacy-preserving
blockchain. The model is comprised of two parts: identity
authentication and the calculation of the nodes to make final
decisions and write them into data blocks.
Recently, the authentication of V2X communications has
been well studied. For instance, Yang et al. [7] implemented
an authentication model for V2X communications. This model
consists of two schemes: one scheme for V2V communica-
tions, and another for V2I communications. Villarreal-Vasquez
et al. [8] proposed a dynamic approach which achieves the
trade-off between safety, security and performance of V2X
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systems. However, the analysis is limited to V2V commu-
nications compliant with IEEE802.11p. In addition, Kiening
et al. [9] studied the security requirements for V2X systems
in particular trust assurance levels. A certification framework
was designed to support trust establishment between road
entities in V2X communications. Indeed, the node should
be trusted if it has been correctly authenticated. Ahmed and
Lee [10] evaluated security services of the new LTE-based
V2X architecture. Building on evaluation results, a practical
solution was proposed to protect privacy and achieve security
requirements of message exchange in V2X networks. Also,
Jung et al. [11] suggested a procedure and test scenario to
achieve secure communication for autonomous cooperation
driving. Furthermore, there are some research on ensuring
data integrity. To defend against both false data injection and
packet drop attacks, a new model was proposed in [12] that
particularly focuses on the security in sensing systems for
V2X networks. However, far less effort has been devoted to
defending against internal attacks.
To deal with internal attacks, this paper studies a global
roaming trust-based model for V2X communications. The
performance of the proposed model is then evaluated by
comparing it with an existing model [13]. The simulation
results show that the proposed model outperforms the existing
one. This paper makes two main contributions to the field of
vehicular network security:
• This paper proposes a global roaming trust-based model
for V2X communications. Different from existing re-
search, the nodes have global knowledge about malicious
nodes in the network.
• This paper compares the performance of the proposed
model with the existing model in [13]; the proposed
model improves the False Negative Rate (FNR) by 33.5%
when the percentage of malicious nodes is around 87.5%.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section
II presents the system model. Section III provides a detailed
description of the proposed trust model. Section IV includes
both simulation setup and experimental results. Section V
focuses on performance comparison with the existing model
[13]. Section VI draws conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The considered network consists of N road entities, which
move at various speeds, and M fixed Road Side Units (RSUs).
Each road entity sends three types of messages: Beacon
message which is sent periodically to inform the surrounding
nodes about its current speed, location and direction; trans-
action message which contains confidential information and it
is sent to the core network; and warning message that is sent
to the surrounding RSUs when a malicious node is detected.
Each time the road entity sends a message to the core network,
it should go through the following phases:
• Connectivity phase: each road entity examines its connec-
tivity with the core network and the surrounding entities.
• Communication phase: if the source entity has a connec-
tion with the core network, it forwards its packet to the
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Fig. 2. General model for recommendation attacks
nearest RSU. Otherwise, the packet is sent to a trusted
entity to relay them to the core network.
Moreover, the considered network has two types of nodes
which are normal and malicious nodes. The normal node keeps
monitoring the surrounding environment and sends its packets
to the core network. Also, it relays any received packet to the
nearest RSU. On the other hand, the malicious node launches
various attacks to disturb the network performance such as:
• Selective forwarding attack: occurs when the malicious
node drops some of the received packets randomly to
escape punishment.
• Recommendation attack: occurs when the malicious node
sends bogus recommendations regarding other nodes:
– In good-mouthing attack, the malicious node f sends
good recommendations regarding other malicious
nodes h1, h2, ... hnp as shown in Fig.2(a). In this
attack, the malicious nodes h could be considered as
normal nodes. Thus, the malicious node f disturbs
the decision phase.
– In bad-mouthing attack, the malicious node f sends
bad recommendations regarding other normal nodes
q1, q2, ... qnp as shown in Fig.2(b). In this attack,
the normal nodes q may be classified by node i as
malicious nodes.
III. GLOBAL ROAMING TRUST-BASED MODEL
The global roaming trust-based model maintains two levels
of trust as shown in Fig.3: road entities level and RSU level.
The road entity evaluates the trustworthiness of surrounding
entities, and then sends warning messages to the surrounding
RSUs when a malicious node is detected. When the RSUs re-
ceive high volume of warning messages from the surrounding
entities, they generate an alarm and send it to the central unit.
The details of this model are presented as follows.
A. Road entity level
During time interval t, each road entity measures the
trustworthiness of all surrounding entities. Indeed, node i
continuously monitors its one-hop neighbors j. Then, node i
is able to compute direct trust using the collected information.
In addition, node i sends recommendation requests to the
surrounding nodes k regarding node j. The proposed model
manages two trust components as follows.
• Current Trust - T (t)current(i,j): it is computed by node
i to evaluate the communication experience with node j
during time interval t. It is calculated using
T
(t)
current(i,j) =
T
(t)
past(i,j) + T
(t)
direct(i,j)
2
(1)
It is measured based on the following trust values:
– Past trust - T (t)past(i,j): it is a measure for the past
behavior of node j. The past trust is considered to
prevent the non-continuous malicious behavior.
– Direct trust - T (t)direct(i,j): it is an evaluation for
the communication experience with the neighboring
nodes j. It is computed using
T
(t)
direct(i,j) =
Successful_Interactions
Total_Interactions
(2)
where Successful_Interactions is the number of
successful interactions between node i and node
j, and Total_Interactions is the total number of
interactions between node i and node j.
• Indirect Trust - T (t)indirect(i,j): it is a measure for the
behavior of neighboring nodes j using surrounding nodes'
opinions. Node i collects recommendations from the
surrounding nodes regarding node j. Before computing
indirect trust, node i applies the following steps:
– Confidence value computation- C(t)(i,k): node i mea-
sures the confidence value for each recommender
node k. C(t)(i,k) is computed by
C
(t)
(i,k) =

1, if T (t)l(i,k) ≥ Thmax.
Cw, if Thmin ≤ T (t)l(i,k) < Thmax.
0, if T (t)l(i,k) < Thmin.
(3)
Road Entities
RSUs
Central Server
Fig. 3. Trust levels in the proposed model
where Cw is the confidence weight for uncertain
recommendations.
– Recommendations clustering: node i classifies the
received recommendations into two groups which
are positive and negative recommendations using
Thmin.
After that, each node i calculates indirect trust for node
j by applying different weights α and β for P (t)(i,j) and
N
(t)
(i,j) respectively. It is calculated using
T
(t)
indirect(i,j) = α× P (t)(i,j) + β ×N (t)(i,j) (4)
where P (t)(i,j) is the average value of positive recom-
mendations; and N (t)(i,j) the average value of negative
recommendations. The weights are computed by
α =
n
n+m
,β =
m
n+m
(5)
where n and m are the number of positive and negative
recommendations respectively.
TABLE I
LOCAL TRUST COMPUTATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
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• Local Trust - T (t)l(i,j): each node i is able to compute
local trust for node j and make a decision. Generally,
local trust is computed using
T
(t)
l(i,j) = w1 × Trust1 + w2 × Trust2 (6)
where Trust1 and Trust2 are adjusted based on three
factors which are the occurrence of current communica-
tions between node i and node j; the existence of the
recommendations about node j; and the presence of a
previous connection between node i and node j. The
measurement of Trust1 and Trust2 are described in
Table I.
In addition, trust weights w1 and w2 are changed based
on recommendation factor (RC) and the number of
neighbors. w1 and w2 are weights for indirect trust and
(direct/current or past) trust respectively. w1 represents
the recommendation rate as follows:
w1 = (m+ n)× RC
Neighbors(t)
(7)
where w2 = 1−w1, and Neighbors(t) is the number of
node i neighbors at time t.
• Local decision: node i has a local blacklist which has a
list of malicious nodes based on the local decision. Thus,
node i stops the communication with any node j in the
blacklist. The decision is made using
DLocal =

Trusted, if T (t)l(i,j) ≥ Thmax.
Uncertain, if Thmin ≤ T (t)l(i,j) < Thmax.
Malicious, if T (t)l(i,j) < Thmin.
(8)
where Thmin and Thmax are minimum and maximum
trust thresholds, respectively. After that, the node updates
its local blacklist and sends malicious and uncertain
warning messages to the surrounding RSUs.
B. RSU level
During time interval t′, where t′ > t, RSUs start trust
calculation phase. First, each RSU measures the percentage
of malicious and uncertain alarms regarding node j using
M =
m′
t′
, U =
u
t′
(9)
where m′ and u are the number of malicious and uncertain
warnings respectively. Second, each RSU is able to make a
decision regarding node j using
Decisionj = RateM −RateU (10)
where RateM and RateU are the rates of malicious alarms
and uncertain alarms respectively. They are calculated using
RateM =
M
M + U
(11)
RateU =
U
M + U
(12)
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Simulation time (T) 100 iteration
Speed ranges
Vehicle:(10-30) m/s,
Pedestrians:(0-8) m/s
Cycles:(3-10) m/s,
Motorcycle:(10-30) m/s
Number of nodes 24 nodes
Thmax 0.7
Thmin 0.4
RC 0.3
Cw 0.9
T
(0)
l(i,j)
0.5
Finally, the RSU classifies node j as malicious node when
Decisionj > 0. Therefore, RSU sends malicious alarm to the
central server.
C. Global Trust decision
At this stage, central server can make global decision
regarding node j based on the alarms which are received from
RSUs.
DGlobal =
{
Malicious, if Am ≥ Total_RSUs2 − 1.
Normal, Otherwise.
(13)
where Am is the number of malicious warnings that are
received regarding node j. Node j is added to the global
blacklist when it is classified as malicious node. Central server
broadcasts the updated global blacklist to RSUs. Then, RSUs
rebroadcast it again to all roads entities that are covered by the
network. The road entities updates the local blacklist based on
the received global blacklist.
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
This section describes the simulation setup for evaluating
the performance of the proposed model. The effect of changing
parameters on the false alarm rate is also analysed.
A. Network specifications
We used MATLAB R2016b to conduct the simulation of
a V2X network with 24 road entities and 9 RSUs with
parameters as shown in Table II. The road entities move
over an area of 900 × 900 m2 with various speed ranges.
The considered area is composed of two intersections using
three two-lanes roads. The road entity sends the transaction
message to the core network directly or using a multi-hop
routing protocol. To measure the performance of the proposed
trust model, we study various types of malicious nodes: six
selective forwarding attackers, three good-mouthing attackers
and three bad-mouthing attackers.
B. Simulation Results
In this section, we study the impact of changing parameters
on the global trust measure and relate these to the false alarm
rate. False alarm rate includes False Negative Rate (FNR)
and False Positive Rate (FPR). FNR measures the rate of
undetected attacks, whilst FPR measures the rate of classifying
normal nodes as malicious. We run the simulations using the
initial parameters Thmax = 0.9, RC = 0.3, Cw = 0.9. Then,
we updated their values with the optimal ones.
1) Effect of trust thresholds on false alarm rate: The
simulation experiments were run with initial parameters. We
study how various values of Thmin has an impact on false
alarm rate. Also, it helps us to define the optimal value for
Thmin. The corresponding results are shown in Fig.4 (a). The
following remarks can be made:
• FNR increases when the value of Thmin increases;
• FPR rises significantly as long as the Thmin increases;
• the impact of Thmin is high on FPR because as long
as Thmin goes up that means the malicious range is
expanded. As a result, many normal nodes are classified
as malicious nodes;
• when Thmin = 0.4, it achieves low FNR and FPR values.
Moreover, we study how various values of Thmax has an
impact on false alarm rate. The experiment was run with initial
parameters and Thmin = 0.4. The corresponding results are
shown in Fig.4 (b). We notice that FNR slightly decreases
when the value of Thmax increases, however, the FPR slightly
goes up as long as the Thmax increases. We update initial
value of Thmax with 0.7 which is the optimal value.
2) Effect of recommendation factor (RC): The simulation
experiments were run with updated initial parameters. Here,
we study the effect of various values of RC on the false alarm
rate. By inspecting Fig.5 (a), the following remarks can be
made:
• FPR goes up when the value of RC increases to reach
approximately 0.27, however, the FNR is stable while RC
increases;
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Fig. 4. Effect of changing trust thresholds on false alarm rate
• the RC has an impact on FPR only because RC is a part
of the calculation of indirect trust weight w1. Therefore,
giving high weight to indirect trust results high FPR. As a
result, the model starts making false decisions regarding
the normal nodes.
• we choose RC = 0.3 as an optimal value which is the
same as initial value.
3) Effect of Confidence weight (Cw): We examine various
values of Cw to choose the value that achieves minimum false
alarm rate, as shown in Fig.5 (b). Key findings are:
• FPR goes down when the Cw increases because we give
lower weight for the recommendations that are sent by
uncertain nodes, however, the FNR decreases slightly
when the Cw increases.
• majority of normal nodes are classified as uncertain,
giving recommendations low weight results high FPR.
• the initial value of Cw is the optimal one.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We use the existing model in [13] as a benchmark to
evaluate the performance of the proposed model. The impact
of various rates of malicious nodes on the false alarm rate is
studied on the proposed model and existing model.
A. Effect of selective forwarding attack on FNR
Generally, when the model has a low FNR, it is able to
detect the most malicious nodes. The result that is shown
in Fig.6 (a) represents the FNR for various percentages of
malicious nodes. The following remarks can be made:
• in the existing model, the FNR reaches to 0.73 when the
percentage of malicious nodes is equal to 87.50%.
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false alarm rate
• FNR values in the proposed model is reduced. Thus, the
global decision has the minimum FNR value for all rates
of malicious nodes.
B. Effect of selective forwarding attack on PDR
To measure the model performance, we measure the PDR
with different percentage of malicious nodes as shown in Fig.6
(b). Generally, the PDR is increasing when the percentage of
malicious nodes is increasing. In addition, the existing model
produces high PDR which results from the high FNR. On
the other hand, the proposed model has lower PDR which
improves the network performance.
C. Measuring the improvement rate
We measure the improvement rate on FNR and PDR for the
proposed model in comparison with the existing model [13] as
shown in Fig.7. We notice that the FNR is highly improved in
the proposed model when the percentage of malicious nodes
is equal to 12.50%. In addition, the rate at 50%, which is a
high percentage, increases again to around 50%.
Moreover, we notice that the proposed model provides high
improvement on PDR in comparison with the existing model,
thus, it gains better network performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a global roaming trust-based
model for the V2X network. Various malicious behaviors are
considered to study the performance of the proposed model
which are selective forwarding attack, bad-mouthing attack
and good-mouthing attack. We conducted various experiments
with different percentage of malicious nodes. Comparison
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Fig. 6. Effect of selective forwarding attack on FNR and PDR
results showed that the proposed model improved FNR by
33.5% and PDR by 40% when the percentage of malicious
nodes is equal to 87.50%. In future work, we will improve
the proposed model to consider RSU attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Yu, K. Li, W. Zhou, and P. Li, “Trust mechanisms in wireless sensor
networks: Attack analysis and countermeasures,” Journal of Network
and computer Applications, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 867–880, 2012.
[2] C. A. Kerrache, C. T. Calafate, J.-C. Cano, N. Lagraa, and P. Man-
zoni, “Trust management for vehicular networks: An adversary-oriented
overview,” IEEE Access, 2016.
[3] D. Liu, J. Ni, H. Li, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Efficient and privacy-
preserving ad conversion for v2x-assisted proximity marketing,” in Proc.
IEEE 15th Int. Conf. Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, 2018, pp. 10–
18.
[4] D. Ulybyshev, A. O. Alsalem, B. Bhargava, S. Savvides, G. Mani,
and L. B. Othmane, “Secure data communication in autonomous v2x
systems,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Congress Internet of Things (ICIOT), Jul.
2018, pp. 156–163.
[5] M. A. S. Junior, E. L. Cominetti, H. K. Patil, J. Ricardini, L. Ferraz,
and M. V. Silva, “Privacy-preserving method for temporarily link-
ing/revoking pseudonym certificates in VANETs,” in Proc. 12th IEEE
Int. Conf. on Big Data Science And Engineering, 2018, pp. 1322–1329.
[6] C. Xu, H. Liu, P. Li, and P. Wang, “A remote attestation security model
based on privacy-preserving blockchain for v2x,” IEEE Access, vol. 6,
pp. 67 809–67 818, 2018.
[7] Y. Yang, Z. Wei, Y. Zhang, H. Lu, K.-K. R. Choo, and H. Cai, “V2X
security: A case study of anonymous authentication,” Pervasive and
Mobile Computing, 2017.
[8] M. Villarreal-Vasquez, B. Bhargava, and P. Angin, “Adaptable safety
and security in v2x systems,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Congress Internet of
Things (ICIOT), Jun. 2017, pp. 17–24.
[9] A. Kiening, D. Angermeier, H. Seudie, T. Stodart, and M. Wolf, “Trust
assurance levels of cybercars in v2x communication,” in Proceedings of
the 2013 ACM Workshop on Security, Privacy &#38; Dependability for
Cyber Vehicles, New York, USA, 2013, pp. 49–60.
[10] K. J. Ahmed and M. J. Lee, “Secure, lte-based v2x service,” IEEE
Internet of Things Journal, 2017.
[11] H. Jung, K. Lim, D. Shin, S. Yoon, S. Jin, S. Jang, and J. Kwak,
“Reliability verification procedure of secured v2x communication for
autonomous cooperation driving,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Information and
Communication Technology Convergence, Oct. 2018, pp. 1356–1360.
[12] A. Chattopadhyay, U. Mitra, and E. G. StrÃu˝m, “Secure estimation in
v2x networks with injection and packet drop attacks,” in Proc. 15th Int.
Symp. Wireless Communication Systems (ISWCS), Aug. 2018, pp. 1–6.
[13] A. M. Shabut, K. P. Dahal, S. K. Bista, and I. U. Awan, “Recommenda-
tion based trust model with an effective defence scheme for MANETs,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 2101–
2115, 2015.
0
20
40
60
80
100
12.50% 25% 37.50% 50% 62.50% 75% 87.50%
Im
p
ro
v
em
en
t 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(%
)
Percentage of malicious nodes
FNR PDR
Fig. 7. Improvement rate on FPR and PDR in the proposed model
